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A Case for Another Case Method
Todd D. Rakoff and Martha Minow*

American legal education is pretty good. Generally speaking, it
is rigorous, and generally speaking, students learn a lot. After three
years in law school, students usually leave not only with knowledge of
specific legal materials, but also with the sharp analytic skills and
ability to work in existing legal institutions that people expect from
lawyers. But our society is full of new problems demanding new
solutions. Less so than in the past-less than in the 1930s and less
than in the 1960s-are lawyers inventing those solutions. Much of the
action is moving to graduates trained in other disciplines and
professions, such as economics, political science, and business. In our
view, the stodginess of American legal education is partly to blame.
The plain fact is that American legal education, and especially
its formative first year, remains remarkably similar to the curriculum
invented at the Harvard Law School by Christopher Columbus
Langdell over a century and a quarter ago. 1 Invented, that is, not just
before the Internet, but before the telephone; not just before man
reached the moon, but before he reached the North Pole; not just
before Foucault, but before Freud; not just before Brown v. Board of
Education, but before Plessy v. Ferguson. There have been
modifications, of course; but American legal education has been an
astonishingly stable cultural practice.
We leave to others in this Symposium the task of giving an
adequate historical and sociological account of the persistence of the
Landellian case method. As professors interested in how curriculum is
shaped, and how it could potentially be reshaped, we instead ask a
structural question: What is it in the design of Langdell's case method
*
Respectively Byrne Professor of Administrative Law and Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School. We appreciate, and have profited from, the comments of our
colleague Scott Brewer.
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That method itself echoed medieval casuistry. See generally ALBERT R. JONSEN &
STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 8-11, 16-332
(1988).
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that gave it such staying power? We think the answer-or at least a
good part of the answer-lies in the fact that it was constructed to
address simultaneously several different questions, each of which
must be answered for a professional school curriculum to succeed with
all of its constituencies and in all of its domains. The Langdellian case
method afforded a way to communicate information; to cultivate a
style of reasoning and questioning that was intellectually respectable,
yet also well-suited to the paradigmatic law practice of adjudication;,
and to engage the attention and interests of large numbers of students
at relatively little expense for instruction and materials.
That meeting these multiple goals was its purpose, and not just
its effect, is plain from Langdell's own statement of what he was
trying to do, as set out in his Preface to the very first casebook, A
Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts.2 As Langdell explained it,
the law school case method arose from two circumstances. First, the
case method arose from his own experience as a learner that the way
to learn the law was "by means of cases in some form." 3 Second, the
case method arose from the task he then faced as a teacher, to wit: "I
was expected to take a large class of pupils, meet them regularly from
day to day, and give them systematic instruction in such branches of
law as had been assigned to me." 4 To do the second in light of the first,
he had to choose cases for students to read. But on what basis could he
choose from "the great and rapidly increasing number of reported
cases in every department of law"?5 The answer to this question lay in
the fact that "[law, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles or doctrines"; that "the number of fundamental legal
doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed"; and that it was
therefore possible to take a subject like Contracts; and "without
exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and
arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree
to the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential
doctrines." 6 (According to Langdell, "[tihe vast majority" of actual
cases were "useless and worse than useless for any purpose of
systematic study."7 ) Once the cases were selected, students would be
able to learn a doctrine "by studying the cases in which it is
embodied."8 But students would be expected to work not only from the
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particular to the general, but also from the general to the particular,
because
[t]o have such a mastery of these [principles or doctrines] as to be able to apply them
with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what
constitutes a true lawyer; and hence
to acquire that mastery should be the business of
9
every earnest student of the law.

Without a doubt, there is some tension in this argument. It is
not clear, for example, on what basis "as a science" one can exclude
most of the actual case law as "worse than useless for any purpose of
systematic study."10 One might well have thought that any specimen
of a species had as good a claim to scientific attention as any other.
But this tension reinforces the point that Langdell presented a system
consciously constructed to work as a practical method of legal
education. The strength of his case method lies not in the
irrefutability of any of its elements, but in the way it plausibly links
together the answers to so many questions. What is there to know?
The law consists of a limited number of principles or doctrines. How
are we to know them? From systematic organization of the way they
are embodied in cases. How will we teach them? By discussing the
cases to see what they embody, and by applying the principles to
hypothetical sets of facts. What materials will we use? Reports of the
cases. Will this be practical? The reports are in the public domain; we
can provide all the students copies of the cases, collected into
casebooks. Of what use is knowledge of this sort? The application in
this way of principles of this sort, to new cases, is what lawyers do.
A building resting on many load-bearing supports will often
stand even if one or two of those supports are weakened. Similarly,
Langdell's case method can survive even if one or another of its
component parts is successfully challenged. If, for example, one ceases
to believe that the law consists of principles or doctrines, one might
still use cases to teach one's alternative formulation so long as one still
cares about working from the particular to the general and back
again, in a practical way with a large class, because one thinks this
mirrors what lawyers do in practice. This, it seems to us, helps explain
why the Realist critique of "law as a science" did not obliterate the
case method in law schools; indeed, in many ways the movement just
further entrenched it. But perhaps the method's survival just
resembles the endurance of certain religious traditions that, once
embedded in custom and experience, give rise to new rationales when
the old ones fade away. Thus, the pre-Jewish traditions of shepherds
celebrating a new life-cycle carry over to the "Pascal lamb" of
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
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Passover, and then resurface once more in the vision of Jesus as the
Lamb of God. And so the case method persists and supports
instruction about the indeterminacy of legal results, the arguable
nature of facts, or the influence of politics and personality, rather than
as the systematic expression of a few coherent ideas that Langdell
thought it would illustrate.
Remarkable as such endurance may be, survival is not the only
or even the best test of an educational curriculum, especially given the
pull of the status quo on teachers and administrators. The fact is,
Langdell's case method is good for some things, but not good for
others. We are not talking about fancy goals here; we are talking
about teaching students "how to think like a lawyer." Langdell's case
method fails in this mission. It fails because lawyers increasingly need
to think in and across more settings, with more degrees of freedom,
than appear in the universe established by appellate decisions and the
traditional questions arising from them. The Langdellian approach
treats too many dimensions as already fixed. When what is at issue is
whether an appellate bench correctly decided a case, or how its
decision fits into the general fabric of appellate decisions, selfevidently we have already decided that the paradigmatic institutional
setting for thinking about a legal problem is the appellate court.
Accordingly, we will restrict our consideration of the proper incidence
of legal force to the modes that courts can use. By focusing on
appellate cases, we also assume that the facts of the problem are
known: if not because they are really known, then because the rules of
procedure will treat them as no longer contestable. Moreover, most of
what we know will consist of what K.C. Davis denominated
"adjudicative facts" rather than "legislative facts": The who, what, and
when of the named parties, rather than information about the social
situation in general.' Typically the procedural rules (either the rules
governing how parties frame an issue for decision or the rules
governing discretionary review) will also stipulate the issue (or small
set of issues) that are open for discussion. All but the most formal of
opinions will also present an already-constructed narrative of the
situation. By taking a retrospective view of facts already found and
procedures already used by a court, the appellate decision does little to
orient students to the reality of unfolding problems with facts still to
be enacted, client conduct still to take place, and procedural settings
still to be chosen and framed.
Of course, teachers fight against these restraints-some more
adamantly than others. But it is hard to do so at a deep level. A well11. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404-07 (1942).
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crafted hypothetical, for example, will alter the facts, but it will not
alter the sense that facts are fixed and known (not to mention fixable
and knowable). Asking students to consider whether legislation should
change the will alter the institutional setting; it will not give the
students the materials that ought to inform actual committee work on
a prospective bill. Similar difficulties arise for the class discussion that
would pursue other options such as administrative regulation or,
indeed, private ordering. Even the most imaginative and energetic
teacher simply needs different materials to present these other
options with the kind of depth and rigor that the case method has
permitted within the framework of appellate adjudication. If it is too
strong to say that the appellate case method presents insuperable
difficulties, certainly it is fair to say that this method creates strong
pressures in particular, and rather narrow, directions.
These problems seem to us to be fundamental on both the
theoretical and practical levels. First, as to theory: the study of law is
inevitably drenched now in the multiple theories that have washed
through scholarship in the century since Langdell. "Truth," in modern
and post-modern views, is much more constructed, much less simply
discovered, than the Langdellian model of "science" supposes. What is
known is much more the result of active human agency, and is much
more contextual and perspectival. But this cannot be fixed simply by
pointing out that Langdell worked before Einstein because it is not
accidental that Langdell's view fits easily with the study of appellate
decisions. The opinions state "the facts." Even when countered with
contrasting statements by a dissent, these factual statements do little
to equip students to navigate overlapping and diverging witness
accounts, gaps in forensic material, disputes over significance levels in
statistical studies, or the influence of a narrative frame. Appellate
opinions hide, rather than display, how "facts" are constructed and
how more than one narrative can be consistent with "raw data." The
students we now teach are all raised with media renditions of multiple
perspectives, time shifts, and conflicting realities; even if they have
not seen Rash6mon, they live in a world that presumes the influence
of perspective on what is known and what is real. The appellate
decision neither acknowledges this world nor equips the student to
unpack how courts stabilize lived experiences so that the law may be
applied. The imaginative teacher can work hard with cases to
resurrect or imagine the unstable reality behind the result-felt
injustices, injuries, justifications, beliefs, actions-but still the
appellate adjudicatory setting will eliminate or make irrelevant much
of what he or she wants to consider.
This theoretical point seems to us to recur in the practical life
of the lawyer, and so forms our second fundamental complaint. We do
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not agree with Langdell that mastery of doctrines so as "to be able to
apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled
12
skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer."
Lawyering is more creative and less determinate than that
formulation supposes. All lawyers need to be able to take a set of facts
and see that alternative doctrinal characterizations might be
applicable, and that the choice of which doctrine will be applied will
depend partly on how they shape the case. Lawyers need to see how
conflicting narratives might be built on the data, and to think about
how those narratives might equilibrate in one setting or another.
Lawyers need to be able to think about not only the specific version of
a problem that presents itself, but also about the more general version
of which it is but an instance. Lawyers need to be able to consider
solving problems not just through litigation, but also through
alternative forms of dispute resolution, through legislation, and
through regulatory or executive action.
All of this is not to say that lawyers do not need to think very
cleanly, very precisely, very analytically. We have no more tolerance
for mush than the next law professor does. As we said at the start, we
think the current curriculum does produce students who are sharp in
ways that we, and the society, value. What we are saying, however, is
that students need more, and they need more not for arcane or
unusual careers, but simply to be good lawyers. While an expert in
differentiating mental skills could probably produce a raft of labels for
what they also need, when we think of what students most need that
they do not now get, we think: "legal imagination." What they most
crucially lack, in other words, is the ability to generate the multiple
characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways, and multiple
solutions, to which they could apply their very well honed analytic
skills. And unless they acquire legal imagination somewhere other
than in our appellate-case-method classrooms, they will be poorer
lawyers than they should be.
As a pedagogical matter, it seems to us that the place to start
in creating these additional skills is the time frame by which
materials are assigned. Appellate cases present the world as already
structured in almost all dimensions, so that the few open issues can be
decided crisply. Insofar as professors try to alter those frames, they
must retrace steps that have already been taken. We need to start
instead with a much more open-ended presentation of the world, and

12.

LANGDELL, supra note 2, at vi.
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walk onward.' 3 We need (if the language of the VCR is not already
hopelessly out-of-date) to shift from "rewind" to "play." (Indeed, since
we want to start with raw data, we might even say we are advocating
using a "facts-forward" mode.)
Of course, some of this already happens in law schools.
Students who have a first-rate clinical experience probably learn a lot
of what we are talking about, although they may be limited in the
institutional mechanisms they are able to consider. More importantly,
because they are representing clients, they (and their teachers) must
worry about a whole range of performance skills. These skills are not
necessarily linked to the intellectual skills we address. And perhaps
for just that reason, clinical education that is done right (and is not
just a name for farming students out to poorly supervised externships)
is very expensive. Langdell, as we said, saw as an essential part of his
problem that he was "expected to take a large class of pupils [and]
meet them regularly from day to day." 14 The very practical matter of
efficiently using resources seems still to be one of the equations that
have to be solved by any proposed alternative.
Another place where some of what we are talking about
happens is in other professional schools: notably business schools, but
also schools of public policy and some medical schools. The
archetypical "case" at a business school consists of much more
information, and a much more open-ended situation, than the
appellate cases used in law schools. They are taught by teachers
asking different questions, often in classes as large as law school
classes. A careful study by a Harvard Business School professor
comparing the methods used in several of Harvard's professional
schools found that alternative "case methods" do indeed develop

13. The fact that many law school exams present unfolding problems, albeit in a truncated
form, in effect confesses the gap between the appellate opinion and the lawyers' tasks that we
seek to address.
[I]t has become apparent on several levels that professors do not test what
they teach, as often during the first year curriculum they "teach by the case
method and actually test by the problem method." Typically, first-year law
students are greeted in the first weeks of school with massive reading
assignments of appellate court opinions (the standard Case Method) followed
by class periods which engage in some form of Socratic dialogue regarding
those cases. At the end of the semester, although taught by the Case Method
system, typically they are presented with the standard three-hour exam with
loaded fact patterns providing complicated legal problems for which they
have received little or no explicit training.
Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the Informational Stream to Move
Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 673 (1994) (quoting Myron Moskovitz,
Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 260 (1992)).
14.

LANGDELL, supra note 2, at v.
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different skills. 15 Business school students, for example, generate
alternative solutions and choose among them more ably than the
typical law student; medical school students more successfully learn to
6
identify what they do not know and how to find it out.'
Similar materials have been used sporadically at law schools,
too, 1 7 although we do not know of any effort to make very open-ended,
problem-based materials-materials that would, for example, not be
linked to a particular doctrinal subject-an integral part of the firstyear curriculum. But the type of materials we have in mind can be
described in general. Students ought to be presented with relatively
dense materials that lay out a situation, experienced as a problem for
a person, or group of people, for legal treatment. Students should face
a choice that challenges them to identify options and that permits
multiple resolutions, sometimes within a relatively tight ambit. Such
resolutions might include issues such as which settlement offer would
make it sensible to forego litigation. Sometimes these choices might be
within broader (but still specifiable) alternatives, such as whether
trying to get particular legislative language adopted would be feasible
and preferable to private ordering. The problems ought not to be
situated in one doctrinal area, but should present opportunities for
mental maneuvering around the legal universe. Teaching should
emphasize generating alternative solutions as well as appropriate
grounds for choosing among them. And criteria for resolution should
include legal, normative, and practical considerations.
Indeed, we are members of a committee that is presently
recommending to our faculty a set of curricular revisions that include
the creation of problem-solving materials of this sort, to become
prominent features of our required first-year curriculum. Although, as
must be apparent, we are enthusiasts for the project, we also have
tried to think of what might be said against the proposal. We think
15. David A. Garvin, Making the Case, 106 HARVARD MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 56.
16. Id.
17. Although we admire many teaching efforts that use a "problem method," we distinguish
the detailed fact-drenched case studies we are proposing from the short paragraph-length
problems that are often used in published casebooks. Closer to our proposal are efforts to give
students the actual documents and place them in developed roles with assignments to produce
analyses, recommendations, and decisions. See, e.g., DAVID R. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING:
MATERIALS ON THE PLANNING OF CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS app. A at A1-A37 (2d ed. 1984); see
also Frank E. A. Sander, Learning by Doing, 25 HARVARD L. SCH. BULL., Apr. 1974, at 16 (tax
workshop). Stanford Law School has developed a series of environmental law case studies in this
direction.
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recently developed three international and comparative law problems and assigned each first
year law student to work on one of them for a week. See GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
WEEK ONE: LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/documents
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there are four issues to be addressed. First, law schools teach law, and
we, the professors, may fear that teaching these kinds of problems
may not feel like teaching law. Second, we may simply worry that we
do not have the needed materials and do not know where they will
come from. Third, we may fear that even if we ought to teach like this,
we do not know how to do it. And lastly, we may think that all this is
fine, but it is best done with third-year students, at the end of the day,
rather than as part of the first-year experience.
We hope that what we have already said goes some distance to
addressing the first difficulty: convincing faculty (and students also)
that distinctly legal capacities are engaged in the analysis of complex,
rich factual descriptions of problems and in the generation of
alternative avenues for problem-solving. For this is a good part of
what lawyers actually do: formulate unique assessments of options
based on specialized knowledge about the institutional, conceptual,
and practical benefits and difficulties of each. It cannot be done nearly
as well by someone who does not know "the law" in all senses of the
term, including the most traditional. We may need to develop a better
vocabulary for denominating the particular skills involved, but that
they are legal skills seems to us clear.
In regard to the second difficulty, producing the teaching
materials will indeed require an investment of resources, similar to
what is required when business and policy schools produce case
studies, complete with teachers' notes. Pooling efforts in this direction
is crucial for the same reasons that traditional casebooks enable law
professors to teach without each, personally, having to generate all the
materials for the class. Case studies that already exist in business and
policy school contexts are a start, but as far as we know, these treat
law as a "black box." (Indeed, the "thinness" of the legal framework of
the cases we have seen is one of the things that most convinces us
there is a distinctly legal expertise that needs to be brought to bear.)
Another sensible tactic is to draw upon history. For example,
what understanding of the world lay behind the decision of
environmental-protection lawyers to advocate the use of pollution
credits as a regulatory tool, and what other options could they have
pursued? The creation of workers' compensation as a substitute for
judicially enforced tort liability, the combination of criminal defense
work and media strategy for Martha Stewart, the resistance of the
Catholic Church over requiring employers to supply domestic partner
benefits that led to an inventive compromise in San Francisco, the
possible innovations in U.S. and South African patent laws so as to
enhance the distribution of much-needed pharmaceuticals: in these
and so many other examples, historical experiences offer the detail,
nuance, and insight that would spark the legal imagination.
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But mostly, following the business school model, we think that
case writers will need to get their materials from practitioners. In our
experience, lawyers like to talk about what they have done. While
there may be some need to change facts to protect confidentiality, we
have no doubt that law school cases could be written through
consultation with practitioners. It would not hurt to talk to some
clients, too. Case studies can be written effectively in installments,
with five to fifteen pages laying out the initial situation up to a
decision point for a key actor like the lawyer consulted by a client, and
a next installment that details choices made, repercussions
encountered, and new issues identified. At times a third and even a
fourth installment can follow. One very real benefit of such a format is
to locate students in time so that they can see the consequences of
legal choices and the continuing duties of the lawyer even after an
initial decision has been made. All of this will cost moneyundoubtedly more money than is required just to reproduce appellate
opinions written for our pedagogical benefit at public expense. But if it
works for business schools and public policy schools, we do not see why
the materials cannot be used by enough students for enough years to
amortize within reason the cost of generating them.
Now we come to the unspoken fear of faculty members: Am I
competent to teach these kinds of materials? The worry may be a
matter of pedagogy, or a matter of substantive knowledge. Insofar as
it is a pedagogical anxiety, we think it is largely misplaced. True,
what we are suggesting will require, for many professors, asking new
types of questions about new types of materials. The focus will be
more on alternatives, choices, and living with the sequential
consequences of earlier choices; both students and faculty will be able
to draw upon detailed descriptions of particular transactions and
conflicts, with psychological, economic, and political dimensions
detailed in the materials; and actual documents (entire contracts,
treaties, regulations, notices), the range of players, and institutional
options will all be in the students' hands. But in terms of pedagogical
style, we think the materials ought to allow roughly the usual degrees
of latitude for those teachers who want to be traditional and those who
want to be experimental. Those who are daring could break the class
into small groups for extended simulations; or devise extensive use of
online real-time searching and writing by students in and out of class;
or generate settings in which students work with practicing attorneys;
or experiment with various other approaches. But those who are not
can rely on traditional question-and-response, open discussion, and
the like; and if that is usually their m6tier, we suspect that here, too,
they will meet with success.
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The substantive anxiety is, in our view, more apropos. Law
professors were good law students, and given the history of legal
education, this means that they almost universally feel comfortable
handling appellate opinions in the classroom even if they have no
experience doing so in practice. By contrast, for many of us, the arenas
of the legislature, the agency, the political movement, the mediaperhaps even the trial courts-are ones we may only remotely watch.
Ideally, case studies and teachers' notes could be crafted so that they
could be taught by professors as we know them in law schools as we
know them. But, frankly, many of us will need to learn some new
things. Is this, though, so different from learning the new Supreme
Court decisions each term, or a new statutory or regulatory
framework, or the new reliance on economics or political science in
many of our subjects? We are supposed to keep up with what is
happening in our fields. It does not seem to us that we ought to defend
an out-dated curriculum on the basis that it is the only thing that
matches our out-dated knowledge.
Finally, we come to the question of why problems of this sort
ought to be part of the required first-year curriculum, rather then
being reserved for capstone courses. Our answer is based on what we
have learned from Langdell: The template for legal thinking
established in the first year of law school has real staying power. In
our view, what we have called "legal imagination" is every bit as much
a part of thinking like a lawyer as are the analytical skills we already
teach. Truly, it is hard to ask students to start learning to move about
the whole legal structure when they have only just learned the
location of the rooms and the names of the furniture. But we think the
greater fear is that, if we do not make the effort to challenge students
in this way, students will learn to think of the legal system as only so
many rooms, so many pieces of furniture, that they can never reorder.
As we said at the start, our society is full of new problems demanding
new solutions, and less so than in the past are lawyers inventing those
solutions. We think we can, and ought to, do better.

